INTRODUCTION

Motivation
Defence-in-Depth and Diversity (D3) is one of the fundamental principles for NPP safety assurance. Reactor trip systems (RTS) and engineered safety features actuation systems (ESFAS) are I&C part of NPP Defencein-Depth infrastructure [1] . These I&C systems (first of all, RTS) are multi-version systems. FPGA technology allows creating more reliable and safe NPP I&C systems including multi-version systems based on different version redundancy types that are specific for FPGA-oriented products and processes [2] . It is confirmed by industrial experience of FPGA technology application in safety related NPP I&C systems [3] . Hence, features of this technology should be taken into account to carry on D3 analysis of FPGA-based NPP I&C systems.
Work related analysis
Known works, related to the problem of D3 analysis are divided into following groups: basic concepts of D3 analysis for NPP I&C systems; methods and techniques of diversity assessment as a part of D3 analysis, multi-version systems safety indicators evaluation; experience of development and implementation of FPGA-based NPP I&C.
Basic concepts of D3 analysis for NPP I&C systems were described in [1] . This work specifies features of NPP I&C systems in context of D3.
I&C systems should complement non-I&C features to ensure safety functions. I&C should not degrade the independence between the different barriers to radioactive release. This could be accomplished by separate systems protecting each barrier and D3 within integrated I&C systems. Besides, the D3 strategy should be stated as part of the overall I&C systems architectural design.
Methods of diversity level assessment and evaluation of MVS dependability and safety were analyzed in [4] [5] [6] [7] . There are the following methods: (c) statistical methods using testing and operation data about version faults and software reliability growth models;
(d) fault injection-based assessment based on projectoriented fault profiles, performing of faults injection procedure, proceeding of data and calculation of reliability and safety indicators.
Multi-version technologies of development are based on use of: (a) a bipolar G-level graph [8] , (b) a table of baseline diversity strategies [9] and corresponding metrics. The classification of diversity strategies consists of three families of strategies: different technologies -Strategy A (digital vs analog), different approaches within the same technology -Strategy B (microprocessor vs FPGA) and different architectures within the same technology -Strategy C (IP-based vs VHDL); each of the strategy families is characterized by combinations of diversity criteria that may provide adequate mitigation of potential CCF vulnerabilities according with metrics determined by expert way.
Analysis of the references allows concluding that there are not enough detailed techniques to make decisions concerning D3 and diversity taking into account FPGA features.
Objective and Structure of the Paper
Objective of the paper is to present approach and technique of the D3 analysis for FPGA-based NPP I&Cs. Structure of the paper is the following. The D3 principle in context of NPP I&C and FPGA technology is analysed in the second Section. Features of multi-version FPGA-based I&C systems development are described in the third Section. The technique based on application of CMD (check-list & metrics & reliability block diagrams/Markov's models) approach to assess multi-version systems safety is suggested in the forth Section. Last Section concludes the paper and presents some directions of future researches and developments. 
D3 ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT OF NPP I&C SYSTEMS
Analysis of D3 Principle
Defence in depth (D2) is a hierarchical deployment of different levels of diverse equipment and procedures [1] : » to prevent the escalation of anticipated operational occurrences, » to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed between a radiation source or radioactive material and workers, members of the public or the environment, in operational states and, for some barriers, in accident conditions. D2 consists of a hierarchical deployment of different levels of equipment and procedures in order to maintain the effectiveness of physical barriers placed between radioactive material and workers, the public or the environment, during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences (and, for some barriers, accidents at the plant [10] .
INSAG defines five levels of D2: 1. prevention of abnormal operation and failures; Number of project decisions for multi-version NPP I&Cs as a D3 part increases due to FPGA technologies application, and the following their features [2, 3] : » existed technologies of FPGA projects development (graphical scheme and library blocks in CAD environment; special hardware describing languages VHDL, Verilog, Java HDL, etc; microprocessor emulators which are implemented as IP-cores) allow increasing a number of possible options of different project versions and multi-version I&Cs;
» fault-tolerance, data validation and maintainability are improved due to use of: redundancy for intra-and inter-crystal levels; possibilities of implementation of multi-step degradation with different types of adaptation; diversity and multidiversity implementation; reconfiguration and recovery in the case of component failures; improved means of diagnostics.
DIVERSITY AND MULTI-VERSION FPGA-BASED NPP I&C SYSTEMS
Analysis of standard requirements
Diversity is part of the D3 principle. The diversity principle is used to ensure reliability, functional safety of I&C systems for NPPs and other critical applications (aerospace control systems, railway interlocking and block signal systems, etc.) [5] .
The standard IEC 60880: 2006 defines the use of diversity "as a means of enhancing the reliability of some systems and reducing the potential for certain CCF". In this case different software and hardware are applied to develop redundant channels. It allows decreasing the risks of the most dangerous incidents (common cause failure (CCF)).
The most probable sources of CCF are software design faults or multiple physical faults of different channels. 
They concern:
» systems which must/should be developed and produced using diversity approach;
» diversity types to decrease common cause failure probability of NPP I&Cs: there are different classifications;
» features, benefits and limitations of diversity implementation;
» postulation of necessity regarding:
a. determination of required diversity volume;
b. assessment (justification) of real diversity level;
c. risks associated with the use of diversity.
However, the standards are not enough detailed to make assessment procedure. The most representative document is NUREG7007 [9] ).
The described technique allows assessing level of diversity using general metrics; values of metrics are determined in advance. But this technique does not permit to calculate safety indicators of MVS safety.
Some aspects and procedures of assessing FPGA-based NPP I&C systems presented in [2, 5] taking into account development and verification process features and types of different version redundancy for FPGA projects.
Thus, there are two main problems in the area of diversity approach application:
» choice of product-process diversity types (strategies, types, diversity seeking decisions, etc.);
» assessment of multi-version systems (diversity assessment, safety assessment, reliability assessment, etc.).
Inaccurate evaluation of actual level of diversity (and system safety in whole) is one of the challenges. If the assessment result is underestimated, it causes additional efforts, costs and increases time of implementation. If the assessment result is overestimated, it causes inadmissible increasing of CCF risks.
Challenges Regarding to FPGA Application in Multi-Version NPP I&C Systems
There are a few challenges regarding to development of NPP I&C systems as a whole and FPGA-based I&C systems in particular (see Table 1 ). Main conclusions concerning FPGAbased MVS development and implementation experience are the following [5] : » FPGA-based multi-version I&Cs are used in NPPs during last 10 years, i.e. these systems are new object of analysis and still more unique one;
» FPGA technologies give additional possibilities to develop MVSs and ensure high safety and reliability;
» processes of FPGA project development are similar to processes of SW-based project development. FPGA project product is similar to HW-based project product (hard logic);
» there are no any international standards determined requirements to use of diversity for I&Cs development and application taking into account FPGA features.
Classification of Diversity Types
General diversity classification includes the following types: » human life or cycle diversity (different design organizations/companies, management teams within the same company, designers, programmers, testers, installers, or certification personnel); FPGA diversity classification includes the following types [2, 4] : » diversity of electronic elements (different electronic elements manufactures, technologies of electronic elements production, electronic elements families, electronic elements from the same family);
» diversity of CASE-tools (different developers, kinds and configurations of CASE-tools);
» diversity of projects development languages (joint use of graphical scheme languages, hardware description languages (HDL) or/and IP-cores, different HDLs, different IP-cores); » diversity of specifications (different specification languages), etc. What should be severity of regulation for DA implementation?
CCF risk decreasing Key problem is decreasing number of common version faults (CVF). The CVF number (CCF probability) may be decreased using several types of diversity (multi-diversity or "diversity of diversity"). 
D3 ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF MULTI-VERSION FPGA-BASED NPP I&C SYSTEMS
Approach and Technique of D3 Analysis and Diversity Assessment
The approach to assessment of diversity level and MVS safety is based on the four basic procedures of analysis and evaluation. The first procedure implements D-1,2-analysis, procedures form the second to the forth implement D-3-analysis [11] . Results of analysis are entered in check-list in accordance with rule Yes (if corresponding diversity type is used in system) / No (in opposite case) and is presented as a n-bit Boolean vector.
3. Metric-based assessment of diversity (MAD); initial data for the MAD procedure are results of the CLD analysis and values of metrics and weight coefficients for diversity types (subtypes) used in I&C systems; a result of the MAD assessment is a value of general diversity metric.
MAD stages are the following: a) determination of metric values for different types of applied diversity, i.e. performing two activities: (a1) determination of metric values (local diversity metrics μi for diversity type di and local diversity metrics μij for diversity subtype dij); the metric values may be fixed in advance; (a2) correction of metric values in accordance with development and operation experience; b calculation of general diversity metric for system: (b1) determination (correction) of weight coefficients of metrics (taking into account multi-diversity aspect); (b2) convolution (additive or more complex) of metrics and calculating value of general diversity metric.
The result of this stage is a value of general diversity metric, which can characterize the diversity effect on CCF probability. 
RBD-Based Assessment
Probabilistic assessment is considered in terms of Twochannel Reactor Trip System with three parallel tracks (subchannels) of voting logic "2-out-of-3" in each of the channels. A real system produced by enterprises Research and Production Corporation Radiy was taken as a basis (see Fig. 2 ). Each of the channels of the system independently receives information from sensors and other NPP systems. Each channel is independent and can form reactor trip signal.
Simplified diagram of components of this system is shown in Fig. 2 , where T i.j is a track j in channel i.
Figure 2 | Simplified structure of Two-channel Threetrack System
Reliability block diagram of Two-channel System that does not use diversity (channel diversity) is shown in the Fig. 3 ,a. This diagram does not take into account element of voting logic "1-out-of-2" (element OR in the simplest case).
Reliability index P phi.j determines HW reliability of the track T i.j (defined, first of all, by physical failures). Reliability index P d determines reliability defined by design faults which may be main source of common cause failures (CCF). Majority elements have reliability index P M . Reliability of the One-version Majority Redundant System is represented by the following formula:
If channels are implemented in different HW and SW versions value of P d will consist of three components (see Fig. 3 ,b):
, where Q dr1 -probability of failure caused by relative design faults of the first version;
, where Q dr2 -probability of failure caused by relative design faults of the second version;
» P dа = 1 -Q da , where Q da -probability of failure caused by absolute design faults (common faults of the versions).
Reliability of Diverse System is calculated by the formula:
We consider that P dr1 = P dr2 = P dr and majority elements are equally reliable.
Diversity is usually applied in such a configuration, where different channels are independently implemented with different types of diversity.
However, this is not the only variant of the redundant circuit. A variant of using redundancy in tracks of one channel is shown in the Fig. 4 . 5 . Reliability of such system, that use one version for redundancy (Fig. 5,a) , can be described by the formula: In case of using two different versions for T 1.i and T 2.i , system has RBD, shown in the Fig. 5 ,b, and a formula for reliability calculation:
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If we express the values of reliability (probability of nofailure operation) through failure rates as P = It should be noted that although the single-channel twoversion three-track redundant system has the greater effect of the use of diversity, its application in many ways violates the principle of independence. Therefore the use of such architecture for safety systems of nuclear power plants is complicated.
In the calculations the following values of the failure rate were used where ß=0,1. Graphically dependence of P 1D , P 2D , P 1M and P 2M (formulas (1-4) ) on the time shown in the Fig. 6 .
Tool for Support of D3 Analysis
Instrumentation support of D3 analysis may be carried out by the tool consisting of version redundancy database (for storage of check-lists and results of assessment of multiversion I&C systems), processing modules for calculation of diversity metrics and safety indicators. 
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CONCLUSION
In this paper some problems regarding to D3 analysis and diversity assessment of multi-version I&C systems were discussed. One of the main challenges in this area is a fact that multi-version systems are still unique, failures occurred very rarely, information about failures is not enough representative and is not generalized taking into account development and operation experience for different applications.
Proposed techniques of diversity level and multi-version systems safety assessment are founded on three interconnected approaches. First of them is based on D3 analysis by determining horizontal and vertical diverse echelons. Second one represents metric-based technique allowing to assess diversity level and to compare multiversion systems on application of different kinds and different volume of diversity. Third one is based on the probabilistic models which include key indicator β calculation using metric analysis. This approach and technique allows receiving more accurate assessment of diversity than NUREG7007-based technique due to more detailed presentation of classification attributes.
These theoretical issues were used on development and assessment of FPGA RadICSTM Platform-based I&C systems safety related to NPPs. Next steps of research and development activities may be connected with creation and implementation of tool-based support of all life cycle processes for multi-version systems.
